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MILESTONES FOR ANIMAL WELFARE
Public Prosecutor v. Ling Chung Yee Roy1
ALVIN W.-L. SEE*
I. INTRODUCTION
Animal law is a little-known subject in Singapore. However, the increase in public
awareness and concern about animal welfare issues demand that more attention is
directed at the legal aspects of such issues. An opportunity to examine this area of
the law arose in the case of Ling Chung Yee Roy. The District Court, presided by
District Judge Ng Peng Hong, had to decide whether the accused was guilty of an
animal cruelty offence under s. 42(1)(e) of the Animals and Birds Act.2 The section
provides that "[a]ny person who... causes, procures or, being the owner, permits to
be confined, conveyed, lifted or carried any animal in such a manner or position as
to subject it to unnecessary pain or suffering.., shall be guilty of an offence..." This
case is important for two reasons. First, it adds to the few existing local case law
on animal cruelty. 3 It is the first time a Singapore court has considered a situation
that falls short of obvious cruelty. This made it necessary for the court to examine
more carefully the legal requirements of the cruelty offence, particularly the meaning
of "unnecessary suffering", in order to determine the scope of its application. By
contrast, the previous cases all involved serious abuse, which clearly amounted to
a cruelty offence, thus making it unnecessary to state the scope of the offence with
precision. Secondly, the case was decided shortly after the government accepted the
recommendation of the Animal Welfare Legislation Review Committee ("AWLRC")
to amend the ABA to impose a duty on a person responsible for an animal to ensure
Assistant Professor, School of Law, Singapore Management University. I would like to thank Goh Yihan
and Yip Man for their helpful comments. All errors are my own.
[2013] SGDC 252 [Ling Chung Yee Roy].
2 Cap. 7, 2002 Rev. Ed. Sing. [ABA].
3 See Public Prosecutor v. Hooi Yin Wang David [2006] SGDC 204; Public Prosecutor v. Seah Kian Hock
[1997] 1 S.L.R.(R.) 491 (H.C.); R. v. Banjoor [1930] S.S.L.R. 216 (S.C.); Crane v. Paglar [1888] 1
Straits Law Journal 72 (S.C.). See also, Public Prosecutor v. Gracia Michael [1999] 3 S.L.R.(R.) 249
(H.C.), which concerned the offence of killing an animal under s. 428 of the Penal Code (Cap. 224, 1985
Rev. Ed. Sing.). While awaiting sufficient local case law on the subject to build up, it remains necessary
to draw guidance from the interpretations of the old English and Scottish animal cruelty statutes, on
which s. 42 of the ABA, ibid. is substantially based.
Published in Singapore Journal of Legal Studies, 2014, (1), 238-245.
Milestones for Animal Welfare
its welfare. An examination of the relationship between cruelty law and welfare law
will be useful in determining the continued importance of Ling Chung Yee Roy when
the statutory amendment comes into force.
II. BACKGROUND
The majority of animal cruelty complaints were against pet owners, of which a
significant number concerned the lack of care and improper confinement. 4 While
the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, Singapore ("SPCA"), has always
been robust in pushing for prosecution for such cases, the Agri-Food & Veterinary
Authority of Singapore ("AVA") adopts a more passive stance unless the case concerns
obvious cruelty. For cases that it considers to be less serious, the AVA addresses them
mainly by issuing warning letters or imposing composition fines. In Ling Chung Yee
Roy, the AVA seemed to have broken this conventional practice, signalling that it
might become more proactive in its approach to animal cruelty, a change that is most
welcomed.
The accused in Ling Chung Yee Roy was the owner of a Border Collie dog named
Hugo. For over a period of six months, Hugo was kept on the balcony of the accused's
flat. It was seen to be there most of the time, day and night. The balcony, measuring
about 3 m x 1.5 m, had no proper shelter hence exposing Hugo to the sun and rain. A
plastic pet carrier measuring 0.76 m x 0.61 m x 0.61 m, which was not much larger
than Hugo, was subsequently added to the balcony but this too did not sufficiently
protect Hugo from the elements. Hugo was also not provided with sufficient food
and water. Its bowls were usually empty and on several occasions it was seen
kicking and flipping the bowls. Hugo's incessant barking attracted the attention of
the accused's neighbours. Concerned about Hugo's ordeal, they reported the matter
to the SPCA, which sent an inspector to investigate. The SPCA later referred the
matter to the AVA as the accused did not heed its advice to improve Hugo's living
condition. Due to the perceived inaction of the AVA, the SPCA proceeded to lodge
a Magistrate's complaint.5 Eventually, the AVA took over the case and decided to
commence prosecution against the accused.
III. THE OFFENCES
In Ling Chung Yee Roy, the focus of the prosecution's case was on Hugo's prolonged
exposure to the elements as a result of its confinement in the balcony. The accused was
charged and eventually found guilty under s. 42(1)(e) of the ABA, which prescribes
that a person commits an offence if he "causes, procures or, being the owner, permits
4 For statistics supplied by the Agri-Food & Veterinary Authority of Singapore and the Society for the
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, Singapore, see AWLRC, "Recommendations from Animal Welfare
Legislation Review Committee" (March 2013) at 11, 65, 66, online: Ministry of National Development
<http://www.mnd.gov.sg/AWLRCreport/#/l/> [AWLRC, "Recommendations"].
SPCA, "Annual Report" (July 2011 to June 2012) at 10, online: Society for the Prevention of Cru-
elty to Animals, Singapore <http://www.spca.org.sg/pdf/SPCA%20Annual%2OReport%202011-2012-
low%20res.pdf>.
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to be confined, conveyed, lifted or carried any animal in such a manner or position
as to subject it to unnecessary pain or suffering". He was fined $5,000.6
The accused could also have been charged under s. 42(1)(a), which makes it an
offence to cruelly ill-treat an animal,7 and under s. 42(1)(d), which makes it an
offence to cause an animal unnecessary pain or suffering by wanton or unreasonable
conduct. 8 However, for the present case at least, there is no practical advantage in
relying instead on these general offences. The offence under s. 42(1)(e) is merely a
more specific version of these general offences. 9 All three offences require the proof
of unnecessary suffering, a concept that will be revisited below. 10
Since the prosecution also alleged that the accused failed to provide Hugo with
sufficient food and water, another glaringly relevant provision is s. 42(1)(c), which
states that a person commits an offence if "being in charge of any animal in con-
finement or in the course of transport from one place to another neglects to supply
the animal with sufficient food and water". That the prosecution chose to ignore
this offence is a matter of curiosity, for its requirements are less stringent and thus
easier to fulfil. Unlike ss. 42(1)(a) and 42(1)(d)-(e), s. 42(1)(c) does not require
proof of unnecessary suffering.11 The focus, instead, is on whether the food and
water supplied to the animal were insufficient. This would have been easily estab-
lished on the facts of Ling Chung Yee Roy given the "ample evidence to support
the prosecution's case that the dog was not provided with adequate food and water
at the material time". 12 But since the prosecution decided to charge the accused
under s. 42(1)(e), it became necessary for the court to grapple with the concept of
unnecessary suffering. 13
IV. THE MEANING OF UNNECESSARY SUFFERING
The court in Ling Chung Yee Roy was obviously troubled by the fact that unnecessary
suffering is not defined in the ABA. 14 But it ultimately held that Hugo has been sub-
jected to unnecessary suffering. This finding is clearly correct and well supported in
principle. To assess this finding, it is useful to consider separately the two constituent
elements of the concept of unnecessary suffering.
6 A person who commits an offence under s. 42(l) of theABA, supra note 2 is liable to a fine not exceeding
$10,000, or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months, or to both.
7 Ibid., s. 42(1)(a): "Any person who (a) cruelly beats, kicks, ill-treats, over-rides, over-drives, over-
loads, tortures, infuriates or terrifies any animal... shall be guilty of an offence..."
Ibid., s. 42(1)(d): "Any person who (d) by wantonly or unreasonably doing or omitting to do any act,
causes any unnecessary pain or suffering or, being the owner, permits any unnecessary pain or suffering
to any animal... shall be guilty of an offence..."
9 Thus, case law interpreting the U.K. equivalents of ibid., ss. 42(1)(a) and 42(1)(d) is also relevant in the
interpretation of ibid., s. 42(1)(e).
10 The word "cruelly" in ibid., s. 42(1)(a) is to be understood to mean the causing of unnecessary suffering.
For this interpretation of the same word in the Cruelty to Animals Act 1849 (U.K.), 12 & 13 Vict., c. 92,
s. 2, see Ford v. Wiley (1899) L.R. 23 Q.B.D. 203 [Ford]; Budge v. Parsons (1863) 3 B. & S. 382, 122
E.R. 145; Bowyer v. Morgan (1906) 70 Justice of the Peace Reports 253; Barnard v. Evans [1925] 2
K.B. 794.
1 It may be that unnecessary suffering is deemed to result from the deprivation of food and water.
12 Ling Chung Yee Roy, supra note 1 at para. 59. See also ibid. at para. 53.
13 Although the court could have amended the charge by virtue of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap. 68,
2012 Rev. Ed. Sing.), s. 128.
14 Ling Chung Yee Roy, supra note 1 at para. 57.
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A. Suffering
First, it is necessary to determine what amounts to suffering. The accused's main
argument was that Hugo has not suffered. 15 He claims that for the offence to apply,
Hugo must be shown to be ill or injured; there must at least be some indication that
it has suffered from heatstroke, sunburn or dehydration. 16 At trial, he called three
veterinarians to testify that Hugo was healthy and fit. However, as Hugo was only
examined at a much later date, none of the evidence shed any light on whether it
was healthy during the relevant period for which the offence was alleged to have
been committed. On the other hand, the prosecution did not tender any evidence
to show that Hugo fell ill during the relevant period. Therefore, if the accused's
argument of what amounts to suffering was adopted, the prosecution would have
failed to discharge its burden of proving suffering.
Fortunately, the court disagreed with the accused and held that the way Hugo was
kept "will have a negative impact on its well-being" and that "the welfare of the dog
is not dependent on whether the dog is healthy or not". 17 As this was a response
to the accused's argument that Hugo was healthy in the sense that it was neither ill
nor injured, the court merely meant to say that suffering is not confined to being
ill or injured. The court should not be understood as suggesting that no suffering
needs to be proven as the proof of suffering is clearly required by s. 42(1)(e). 18 The
court went on to accept the opinion of one of the prosecution's expert witnesses
that Hugo could suffer stress due to its prolonged exposure to the elements. 19 In
doing so, the court has recognised that mental suffering is relevant for the purposes
of the cruelty offence. The relevance of mental suffering is also reflected in two
other cruelty offences under the ABA. It is an offence under s. 42(1)(a) for a person
to cruelly ill-treat an animal by infuriating or terrifying it, and an offence under
s. 42(1)(f) for an animal owner to abandon his animal in circumstances likely to
cause it unnecessary suffering or distress. The holding is also consistent with the
prevailing position under U.K. law. In the Scottish case of Patchett v. Macdougall,
Lord Hunter explained that the concept of unnecessary suffering "imports the idea
of the animal undergoing, for however brief a period, unnecessary pain, distress or
tribulation".
20
This aspect of the court's decision has important implications. As the SPCA
complained:
2 1
A number of cases that have come under the SPCA's purview have escaped pros-
ecution by the Agri-Food & Veterinary Authority of Singapore (AVA") or the
police precisely due to the uncertainty with respect to whether the law covers an
15 Ibid. at para. 34.
16 Ibid. at para. 58.
17 Ibid. at para. 59.
18 The necessity of proving suffering is best emphasised in the Scottish case of Patchett, infra note 20. See
also, Isted v. C.P.S. (1998) 162 Justice of the Peace Reports 513 at 520.
19 Ling Chung Yee Roy, supra note 1 at para. 59.
20 1983 Justiciary Cases 63 at 67 [Patchett].
21 SPCA, "Proposal for Legislative Reform: Recommendations to Strengthen Animal Welfare Laws in
Singapore" (2011) at para. 14, online: Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, Singapore
<http://www.spca.org.sg/documents/spca-proposalforlegislativereform.pdf> [SPCA, "Proposal"].
Sing. J.L.S.
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animal's mental/emotional suffering and also due to the difficulties of proving
such mental suffering where there is no palpable physical injury.
A relevant case that had attracted much attention concerned a dog named Butters. In
a video recording uploaded onto the internet in 2010, Butters was seen being beaten
repeatedly by its owner using a bundle of thin wooden sticks. Despite considerable
public outrage, the AVA decided not to prosecute the owner but instead issued a stern
warning. One reason for the decision was that the AVA found Butters to be "healthy
and in good condition". 22 The SPCA, on the other hand, took the view that Butters
had suffered mentally from the ordeal.23
The fact that it is less easy to determine mental suffering as compared to physical
suffering is no reason for rejecting the former as a form of suffering. In fact, the
argument that it is difficult to prove mental suffering is an overplayed one. Given the
rapid advancements in animal science, mental suffering could now be determined
with some degree of precision.24 Inferences of mental suffering could be drawn
from the behavioural and physiological responses of the animal to its environment.
In many cases, especially concerning common animals, the matter may even be
determined by common sense, or what the SPCA called a "logical approach".25
In Hugo's case, for example, it is possible to infer stress and frustration from its
incessant barking and its action of kicking its empty bowl around. These were not
normal behaviours of a happy and comfortable dog. The prosecution witnesses, a
number of whom are veterinarians and experts on dogs, were unanimous in their
views that Hugo must have suffered in the condition it was kept.
26
B. Unnecessary
The second question is whether Hugo's suffering was unnecessary. It is suggested that
this matter should be determined using an objective reasonableness test.2 7 Essentially
a test of negligence, it relies on the hypothetical reasonable person in the accused's
position to supply the acceptable standard of conduct, falling short of which the
animal suffering will be considered to be unnecessary. The accused was to be judged
by the standard of a "reasonably caring, reasonably competent owner". 28 In Ling
Chung Yee Roy, the court implicitly accepted the objective reasonableness test when
it held, agreeing with the views of several witnesses, that "any reasonable person
would no doubt conclude that [what Hugo has experienced] constitutes suffering and
22 "'Dog abuse' duo let off with stern warning" The Straits Times (23 July 2010) A3 ['Dog abuse' news
report].
23 SPCA, "Proposal", supra note 21 at para. 29.
24 See mainly, Marian S. Dawkins, Animal Suffering: The Science ofAnimal Welfare (London, New York:
Chapman and Hall, 1980); Bernard E. Rollin, The Unheeded Cry: Animal Consciousness, Animal Pain
and Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); Caroline E. Manser, The Assessment of Stress
in Laboratory Animals (Horsham: Royal Society for the Prevent of Cruelty to Animals, 1992); and the
collection of essays in Franklin D. McMillan, ed., Mental Health and Well-Being in Animals (Oxford:
Blackwell Publishing, 2005).
25 SPCA, "Proposal", supra note 21 at paras. 20-33.
26 See Ling Chung Yee Roy, supra note 1 at paras. 21-3 1.
27 See Alvin W.-L. See, "Animal Protection Laws of Singapore and Malaysia" [2013] Sing. J.L.S. 125.
28 R.S.P C.A. v. Isaacs (12 November 1993), unreported (Q.B.) (the quotation was taken from the unreported
transcript of the judgment).
[2014]
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it is unnecessary". 29 Clearly, a reasonably caring and competent dog owner would
not have subjected his dog to prolonged exposure to the elements and to deprive it
of sufficient food and water.
One significant implication of adopting the objective reasonableness test is that
it implicitly rejects the requirement of mens rea, e.g., intention to cause suffering
or knowledge that suffering has been caused. While this may seem like an obvious
point, especially since s. 42(1)(e) makes no reference to such a requirement, it is
worth stressing again because the requirement of mens rea is often assumed. A
recent example is the case of Butters the dog, where another reason why the AVA
decided not to prosecute was because it was satisfied that the owners had "no ill
intention to hurt their pet dog while attempting to discipline it" and that "this case was
different from one of animal cruelty, which involves deliberate intent to inflict harm
and severe pain on an animal". 30 Although prevalent in 19th century England and
Scotland, this view has since been rejected. 3 1 In the Scottish case of Duncan v. Pope,
Lawrence J. emphasised that the only question is whether there was "cruelty in fact"
and "the intention of the [defendant] in doing this does not matter". 32 Similarly, in the
English case of Ford v. Wiley, the court rejected the view that an accused could escape
liability by pleading ignorance, for to allow so will render many animals "suffering
victims of gross ignorance and cupidity". 33 Clearly, the concept of cruelty is wide
enough to also include situations where animal suffering is caused by negligence or
indifference. Imposing a requirement of mens rea would unduly restrict the scope of
the cruelty offences and hence reduces the extent of protection afforded to animals.
In Ling Chung Yee Roy, the accused argued that he was not aware of how much
rain and water would cause suffering to Hugo and he was also not sure what would
constitute suffering to Hugo.34 This implicitly asserts a requirement of mens rea.
Although the court did not address this argument, the finding of guilt must imply that
the argument was rejected.
V. ANIVAL WELFARE AND ANIMAL CRUELTY
The court's references to Hugo's welfare in assessing whether Hugo has suffered
unnecessarily are justified by the fact that unnecessary suffering and poor welfare
are not mutually exclusive concepts. 35 The welfare of an animal refers to "its state
as regards its attempts to cope with its environment". 36 It is to be measured in terms
29 Ling Chung Yee Roy, supra note 1 at para. 59.
30 'Dog abuse' news report, supra note 22.
31 For the nineteenth century English and Scottish cases that insisted on the requirement of mens rea, see
Mike Radford, Animal Welfare Law in Britain: Regulation and Responsibility (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2001) at 224-226.
32 (1899) 63 Justice of the Peace Reports 217.
33 Ford, supra note 10 at 225 (Hawkins J.).
34 Ling Chung Yee Roy, supra note 1 at para. 35.
35 The court also referred to the long title of theABA, supra note 2, which says: "An Act... for the prevention
of cruelty to animals, birds or fish; for measures pertaining to the general welfare and improvement of
animals, birds or fish in Singapore..."
36 D.M. Broom, "Animal Welfare: Concepts and Measurements" (1991) 69 J. Animal Science 4167 at
4168. A similar definition is adopted by the World Organisation for Animal Health ("OlE"), of which
Singapore is a member: OlE, Terrestrial Animal Health Code, (2013) at Article 7.1.1, online: OlE
Sing. J.L.S.
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of degree. As Professor Radford explains, "at any given time, the state of its welfare
will be located on a point somewhere along a spectrum between very good at one
end, indicating an excellent quality of life, and, at the other, so poor that it ultimately
proves to be fatal". 37 The question is, at what point of the welfare spectrum would
one regard cruelty to have occurred?
Although suffering is the best indicator of poor welfare, poor welfare need not
always involve suffering. The animal may have yet to experience suffering from its
poor welfare. For example, an animal may be exposed to increased risk of certain
illnesses as a result of being deprived of sufficient exercise, fed with food that has
insufficient nutrients or that is not suitable for its breed, etc. The animal's welfare
is considered to be poor even though it has yet to fall ill or suffer.38 Poor welfare
without suffering is generally beyond the concern of most existing cruelty laws.
39
In the case of a person responsible for an animal, cruelty law only imposes a duty
to refrain from causing, and to prevent, unnecessary suffering to the animal. There
is no duty to ensure the welfare of an animal beyond what is necessary to prevent
unnecessary suffering.
Whether a person responsible for an animal should be required to ensure that the
animal's welfare is maintained at a good level is a separate question. Most major
jurisdictions have taken this further step. For example, under s. 9 of U.K.'s Animal
WelfareAct 2006,40 a person commits an offence if he fails "to ensure that the needs of
an animal for which he is responsible are met to the extent required by good practice".
The section also sets out a non-exhaustive list of such needs, which include the need
for a suitable environment, the need for a suitable diet, the need to exhibit normal
behaviour patterns, etc.4 1 Almost three months before Ling Chung Yee Roy was
decided, the AWLRC's recommendation to include a welfare provision into the ABA
was accepted by the Ministry of National Development.4 2 When the new welfare
provision comes into force in the near future, it would allow enforcement action to
be taken to assist an animal that has poor welfare without having to wait until it has
actually suffered. In theory, if enforcement is optimal, poor animal welfare should
be detected before cruelty arises. In reality, however, there will be many cases where
<http://www.oie.int/en/international-standard-setting/terrestrial-code/access-online/>: "Animal wel-
fare means how an animal is coping with the conditions in which it lives" [emphasis omitted] [OIE,
Health Code].
37 Radford, supra note 31 at 216. See also Broom, ibid. at 4168.
38 See also Broom, ibid. at 4169:
If the housing conditions or management procedures result in impaired immune system function
and consequently increase susceptibility to disease, then the state of the animal is clearly affected
and welfare is poor. This poor welfare occurs before any suffering, although it may well become
worse as disease and associated suffering develop.
39 An exception is the offence of abandonment under s. 42(1)(f) of the ABA, supra note 2, where only the
likelihood of the unnecessary suffering needs to be proven. The welfare of an abandoned animal may be
poor because of the increased risk of it experiencing starvation, falling ill, being run down by vehicles,
etc., even if none of these has yet to occur when the animal is found.
40 (U.K.), 2006, c. 45 [AWA (U.K.)].
41 See also, OIE, Health Code, supra note 36 at Article 7.1.1 [emphasis omitted]:
An animal is in a good state of welfare if (as indicated by scientific evidence) it is healthy, comfort-
able, well nourished, safe, able to express innate behaviour, and if it is not suffering from unpleasant
states such as pain, fear, and distress.
42 AWLRC, "Recommendations", supra note 4 at 36, 37. See also the SPCA's recommendation: SPCA,
"Proposal", supra note 21 at paras. 45-80.
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the animal is found to have suffered from its poor welfare. Ling Chung Yee Roy will
continue to be important because it defines the extent to which existing cruelty law
applies to such cases. The finding of cruelty will also allow the courts to impose




The decision in Ling Chung Yee Roy represents a significant milestone in the efforts
to protect animals from cruelty. Aside from its legal significance, the facts of the
case also shed light on other important matters. First, the case marks a change
on the part of the AVA in becoming more proactive in prosecuting animal abusers.
This is important, as criminal conviction is clearly a more effective deterrence than
composition fines and warning letters. While the decision to prosecute may have been
a result of public pressure, particularly from the SPCA, the AVA must nonetheless be
commended for taking into account public opinion in its decision-making process.
As explained earlier, whether an animal suffering is unnecessary should be decided
by applying the objective reasonableness test. The attribute of the hypothetical
person is necessarily informed by society's attitude on the matter. Secondly, the
case also shows an increase in public concern about the issue of animal welfare as
well as a willingness by the public to play their part in the enforcement of cruelty
law. The SPCA received eight complaints. 44 Three of the accused's neighbours
came to testify in court. They even supplied video and photographic evidence of
Hugo's ordeal. Clearly, the effort to protect animals from cruelty is only effective
and sustainable through the cooperation of all stakeholders. In this regard, it may be
confidently said that Singapore is making good progress.
43 For example, under ss. 4-8 of the AWA (U.K.), supra note 40, the maximum imposable fine for a cruelty
offence is £20,000, but only £5,000 for a welfare offence under s. 9 of the AWA (U.K.), ibid.
44 SPCA, "Annual Report", supra note 5 at 10.
Sing. J.L.S.
